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The Program on Alternative Investments of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business analyzes three sets of 
alternative asset classes—private equity, hedge funds, and real estate—in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia in inter-
national perspective. The Program meets its substantive goals through a combination of research projects and seminars,
conferences, and symposia, the latter featuring leading practitioners in each of these three alternative asset classes. For a 
schedule of upcoming events and other information about the Program on Alternative Investments, please visit 
www.gsb.columbia.edu/cjeb/alt_investments. For information on the Center on Japanese Economy and Business, please
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A s Japan finally embraces corporate reform, the buyout industry has begun to make its mark.There have been several high profile cases over the past few years, but one transaction has
been particularly notable: the restructuring of retailing giant Daiei by Advantage Partners, LLP,
Marubeni Corporation, and the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ). Daiei’s restruc-
turing is a unique example of how a private equity firm and a government organization are work-
ing together to implement a plan to restructure a large Japanese corporation. It is a test case that
many observers are watching closely to see how private equity firms may contribute to the restruc-
turing of corporate Japan. 
To explore the role of private equity in Japanese restructuring, the Program on Alternative Investments
organized a symposium and invited two leading experts on Daiei’s ongoing reforms. The first speaker
was Mr. Atsushi Saito, President and CEO of the IRCJ, a Japanese government-backed agency staffed
with executives drawn from both the public and private sectors to restructure ailing Japanese compa-
nies. The second speaker was Mr. Taisuke Sasanuma, Representative Partner of Advantage Partners, one
of Japan’s leading buyout firms and the company principally in charge of restructuring Daiei. Following
these presentations, Professor Hugh Patrick, Director of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business,
offered comments and questions in his role as discussant. The symposium was held on November 15,
2005, on the Columbia campus, and was moderated by Dr. Mark Mason, Director of the Program on
Alternative Investments.  
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MARK MASON
Director, Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, Columbia
Business School 
I’d like to welcome you to this after-
noon’s symposium, the thirteenth
event of this type held here in New
York since the Program on Alternative
Investments was established in 2002.
Today’s symposium will examine the
role of private equity in Japanese
industrial restructuring through a
consideration of the Daiei case.
Although buyouts have become an
increasingly common form of busi-
ness activity in the United States and
Europe, they are still relatively new
in Japan. And in part due to this new-
ness, buyouts continue to meet with
skepticism in some quarters in Japan. 
One argument in favor of buyouts, 
of course, is their potential role to
streamline business organizations and
therefore make industry more efficient.
Daiei is one of the largest, most visible
Japanese companies ever acquired by
a private equity firm in Japan—and is
also a company that, in many respects,
badly needs to be fixed. As such, the
substantial interest in Daiei acquired
this past spring by buyout specialist
Advantage Partners, together with
Marubeni, the Japanese general trad-
ing firm, constitutes what I would
call a key test case for the potential
role of buyout firms in restructuring
Japanese business more generally. 
Yet the case of Daiei, Japan’s third
largest retailer, is not a pure private
sector story. Also critical has been
the role of the Industrial Revitalization
Corporation of Japan, or IRCJ, a
Japanese government-backed organi-
zation designed to promote economic
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revitalization through business
restructuring. In fact, it was the IRCJ
that selected Advantage Partners and
Marubeni to lead the rehabilitation 
of the distressed Japanese retailer,
and it is the IRCJ that still owns
roughly one-third of the retail giant. 
To explore today’s topic, I have invited
two of the leading players in this
buyout case, together with our Center
Director, to share their thoughts. It is
now my pleasure to introduce our
first speaker, Mr. Atsushi Saito, President
and CEO of the IRCJ. Mr. Saito had a
distinguished career in the Japanese
financial services sector before taking
on his current assignment more than
two years ago. I can’t think of any-
one more qualified than Andy Saito
to provide both an overview of the
IRCJ and a context for the restructur-
ing of Daiei. Saito-san?
ATSUSHI  SAITO
President and CEO 
Industrial Revitalization Corporation 
of Japan
It is my honor to be invited to this
symposium to share my thoughts on
private equity and corporate restruc-
turing in Japan from the perspective
of the IRCJ. Since my presentation is
limited to twenty minutes, I would
like to focus on only a few topics:
first, I would like to talk about the
previous absence, or even denial, 
of market-based principles in the
Japanese social structure; second,
how the IRCJ unveiled and chal-
lenged these obstacles; third, how 
the IRCJ successfully pushed forth
financial and business restructuring;
and fourth, what changes are occur-
ring in Japanese society due to these
efforts. 
The IRCJ’s mission is to play a lead-
ing role in promoting a market-based
economic system through the execu-
tion of innovative business revitaliza-
tion schemes. The primary reason
why Japan lost fifteen years of poten-
tial economic growth was due to the
absence of revitalization components
in the business recycling process.
This hindered the optimal allocation
of capital and labor. Traditionally, the
Japanese don’t believe in the concept
of the survival of the fittest, which
would widen the income gap and
raise social costs. In liberal, Anglo-
American societies, you can argue
that the losers are those whose exis-
tence is denied by society. In Japan,
however, this kind of argument
would be strongly criticized as 
arrogance. The IRCJ has boldly 
challenged these traditional Japanese
conventions and practices. 
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Japan’s weakness manifested itself
through crony capitalism and
Japanese banks’ nonperforming loan
problems. As inflation continued to
affect the economy, Japan developed
a connection-oriented or bureaucratic
allocation-oriented economy instead
of a market-oriented economy. This
system kept us inefficient. The banks
would give out loans based on personal
connections, not on any financial 
figures or accounting. The practices
of marking assets to market or using
impairment accounting were virtually
absent, and stringent corporate gover-
nance was avoided. Most managerial
decisions were made behind closed
doors, making it impossible for a
third party to appropriately analyze 
a company’s risks versus returns. 
Japanese banks focused primarily 
on securing the value of collateral
against the value of a loan. They
never concentrated on the profitability
of the business. The banks didn’t
care much about how the money 
was used. In other words, they didn’t
pay attention to the content or value
of the business for which the loan
was supposed to be used, so long as
the value of the collateralized assets
exceeded debt, since most of the 
collateral was real estate. The bank’s
main interest was to figure out how
to avoid debt forgiveness through
cutting costs and wages, taking
advantage of deferred tax assets, 
and so forth. Thus, Japanese banks
continued to lend to companies that
had major financial problems and
thereby kept them afloat. 
The IRCJ took a completely different
approach to pursue capital efficiency
and increase productivity through
reorganization and revitalization
schemes. Our starting point was to
generate an effective balance sheet 
of the troubled debtor. A company’s
effective balance sheet is calculated
by using the fair-value net-assets
method, which means that you
obtain a corporation’s value by
adding the value of liabilities and
equity capital. 
Effective assets are evaluated and
classified by how readily they can be
converted to cash and their profit-
earning capabilities. For noncore
assets, impairment accounting and
market-value accounting principles
were applied. This process enabled
us to identify a company’s effective
core assets. Effective liabilities are
evaluated by looking at legal or 
contractual payment obligations and
liability allowances. The IRCJ then
looked at the discounted cash flow 
as a method to calculate enterprise
value so we could estimate the most
appropriate amount of debt forgive-
ness. To elaborate, from the IRCJ’s
perspective, the maximum amount 
of debt that the assisted corporation
could repay is the sum of the value
of the going-concern business assets
and the value of assets that are to be
disposed of, as described in the busi-
ness restructuring plan. For debts that
exceeded corporate value calculated
in this way, requests were made for
the debts to be waived.
The IRCJ reiterated to companies that
they must dispose of unprofitable
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businesses and asserted the importance
of correct accounting procedures to
banks, businesses, and even govern-
ment entities. The IRCJ thus explicitly
pushed for companies to restructure
to achieve an optimal mix of debt
and equity, to adopt plans that would
garner optimal returns, and to rebuild
their business models to be consistent
with their goals. This process looked
beyond past cozy corporate relation-
ships that sustained a business. We
also tried to determine if the company’s
core competence was consistent with
its future competition base, if their
subsidiaries were consistent with 
the company’s core business, and if
strengthening the core business could
lead to a better overall business. 
In the case of Daiei, restructuring
meant reclassifying everything,
according to profitability, from those
businesses that should be continued
to those that should not, and reor-
ganizing their poor retail business.
We urged Daiei to depart from their
former business model, including
owning its retail locations, obsessing
over having a nationwide network,
overdiversification and expansion,
and getting rid of its dependence 
on low prices to compete. 
The IRCJ process also revealed vari-
ous problems that existed in the
Japanese social system that hindered
the efficient revitalization of corpora-
tions. One of the most distinguishing
characteristics of the IRCJ is that it
has acted as an arbitrator, or an inter-
mediary, in out-of-court workouts.
Certain elements of corporate restruc-
turing laws that are not obstacles 
in the United States are often so in
Japan and Europe. One could possi-
bly argue that U.S. bankruptcy laws
are debtor- or management-friendly,
whereas Japanese and European
bankruptcy procedures are creditor-
friendly. Thus, the wall between
court proceedings and private, out-of-
court workouts is relatively high in
Japan. 
The most difficult and time-consuming
process for an out-of-court workout
is to obtain unanimous agreement
from all creditors. At this juncture, 
the IRCJ process has dealt only with
financial creditors, giving priority to
repaying ordinary commercial credi-
tors. This is a departure from the
equality principle of statutory reor-
ganization proceedings, but it has led
to a more practical and speedy con-
clusion. Our method has triggered a
discussion on the possible inclusion
of majority rule in the revised Out-of-
Court Workout Guidelines. This new
rule, which wouldn’t require unani-
mous agreement from all creditors for
settlement, will certainly help corpo-
rate revitalization in Japan. 
The payment of debtor-in-possession
(DIP) finance in preference to others
is secured in statutory proceedings,
but is not in private, out-of-court
workouts. In addition, real estate and
other marketable securities are used
as collateral for general financial
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claims but not for DIP finance. Other
highly convertible assets, such as
accounts receivables and inventories,
are used as collateral for DIP finance.
But here comes a serious problem. 
If the process is switched to statutory
proceedings thereafter, these assets
are not considered a priority. Under
the IRCJ law, payment of DIP finance
in preference to others could be
secured as long as it met certain 
conditions. This motivated banks to
provide DIP financing together with
the IRCJ—a problem, I have to admit,
which still needs to be resolved. 
Previously, debt forgiveness based 
on a reasonably viable restructuring
plan could be tax-deductible if banks
negotiated with the tax bureau for
each waiver. To the contrary, debt
forgiveness, as stipulated in the IRCJ
revitalization plan, is authorized as
reasonably viable through a blanket
agreement with the tax bureau. This
greatly facilitated the development of
business restructuring plans. On the
debtor’s side, companies can offset
gains from debt reduction against
prior losses. And losses at creditor
banks from debt waivers are, of
course, tax-deductible. 
The issue of tax advantages in 
business restructuring made great
progress in the tax reform laws this
year. Namely, debt relief in out-of-
court workouts where the Resolution
and Collection Corporation (RCC) or
the Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME) Revitalization Support
Committee is involved, or one that
follows the Out-of-Court Workout
Guidelines, is tax-deductible if the
amount of debt relief is based on 
an effective balance sheet and the
restructuring plan is evaluated by
specialists like lawyers and accountants.
The IRCJ has been vigorously pushing
for companies to adopt the concept
of effective balance sheets, develop
new business models that are consis-
tent with financial restructuring, and
consistently follow up with their turn-
around processes. All this has greatly
influenced how Japanese financial
institutions examine their loan portfo-
lios. The IRCJ’s activities have also
exposed legal and tax problems asso-
ciated with implementing business
revitalization. I have no intention to
give credit only to the IRCJ, but it is
becoming clear that the Japanese
financial and business models are
changing and heading in a new
direction. You may not agree with 
my argument that the sun is beginning
to rise again since other lingering
structural issues remain, including the
nation’s aging population. I should
note, however, that population
growth is not a dominant factor 
to determine the growth of gross
domestic product (GDP). Technology
and a better use of capital are much
more important factors. To this end,
furthering corporate restructuring
holds a key. 
To sum up, you cannot deny that
Japan—a nation that has thrived by
constantly finding new ways to revi-
talize itself—is waking up to a new
dawn. Operating profits are rising as
well as profit margins and return-on-
investments. I am confident that the
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sun is beginning to rise again in
Japan.
MARK MASON
Thank you, Mr. Saito. I would now
like to turn to Mr. Taisuke Sasanuma,
Representative Partner of Advantage
Partners. After obtaining graduate
degrees from Keio and Harvard
Universities and pursuing a career 
in management consulting, Taisuke
co-founded one of the earliest, and
what is today arguably one of the
most successful, buyout firms operat-
ing in Japan. His firm’s leadership
position received further confirmation
this past spring when a group led by
Advantage was awarded the right to
largely acquire and then restructure
Daiei. Although the acquisition
received enormous media attention
when it was announced this past
March, to date there has been little
publicly-available information about
Advantage’s strategy to restructure the
troubled retailer or what impact that
strategy would have. So, here is our




Thank you, Mark. It is a great honor
for me to give a speech at Columbia
Business School. 
Daiei was the first supermarket chain
in Japan, founded in 1957. During
the retailer’s peak, it had $25 billion
in sales, 378 stores, and roughly $500
million in profit. Daiei made three
assumptions that led to its downfall.
First, it assumed that a successful
business model for supermarket
chains could be applied to any kind
of retail sector in Japan, including
discount stores. Besides running 
a supermarket chain, Daiei tried 
to expand its business to discount
stores, department stores, golf courses,
hotel chains, bookstores, and pachinko
parlors (Japanese pinball gambling
chains). Unfortunately, there were
strong specialists in each sector so
the company lost a lot of money
when it diversified. Its second mis-
take was to assume that Japan’s real
estate values would continue to
increase. It made direct real estate
investments every time it opened a
new store. And as you know, in
1989, the real estate bubble burst in
Japan, which made Daiei’s asset-related
balance sheet shrink to one-fourth or
even one-fifth of what it was worth
during its peak. Thus, Daiei’s balance
sheet was destroyed in 1989. In addi-
tion, Daiei management assumed that
the leadership in the organization
could be passed from generation to
generation from within the founder’s
family. But the leadership skills of 
the second generation, in spite of
their working really hard, could not
resolve the huge problems they had
to face. 
These assumptions, as well as the
death of the firm’s founder, Mr.
Nakauchi, led to the demise of Daiei
even after the firm received financial
assistance from banks and government
organizations. Finally, after years of
floundering, Daiei requested assistance
from the IRCJ. In December, Mr. Saito
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started the due diligence process and
decided to help Daiei with its revital-
ization plan. After Advantage Partners
was chosen by the IRCJ to bail 
out Daiei, we placed Ms. Fumiko
Hayashi as Chairman and CEO and
Mr. Yasuyuki Higuchi as COO. It has
been six months since we set up this
new corporate structure, so I’ll give
you a quick report about what’s been
going on. 
Within this process, how and what
kind of role did a private equity firm
play? First, we arranged for a sizeable
and risky infusion of cash into a large
corporation. This is the first time a
private equity firm and other strategic
investors worked together to revital-
ize such a large company. Second,
we designed a plan of action based
on the IRCJ’s original and very thor-
ough restructuring plan. Third, we
arranged and brought on board a
new management team. We monitor
what the new team does, and some-
times I mentor the new CEO and
COO. Fourth, we designed and intro-
duced a new organizational structure,
adding what we call the “key per-
formance indicator program,” which
I’ll explain later. 
The IRCJ’s support plan consisted of
$400 million worth of debt forgive-
ness, the cancellation of $119 million
of preferred stock, and the arrange-
ment of a $600 million cash infusion
by the new corporate owners. In
addition, there was $500 million worth
of equity swaps and the allocation of
$100 million of additional cash for the
future. With this, Daiei’s once dynamic
balance sheet shrank to $4.8 billion
from $10 billion. It is still a highly
leveraged company, but the profile 
of the balance sheet has improved
considerably due to the efforts of 
the IRCJ. 
Based on this balance sheet restruc-
turing, we have started making oper-
ational or strategic improvements 
in the past six months. Advantage
Partners governs and provides finan-
cial assistance, Marubeni Corporation
helps Daiei with managing its retail
chain, and the IRCJ is involved in the
divestiture of Daiei’s core businesses
and its unprofitable stores. 
Let me briefly explain recent trends
in the market. Sales per store for
Daiei and its competitors have been
steadily decreasing over the past ten
years. Those in the supermarket
industry have common problems,
including storage issues. In addition,
the industry has been plagued by the
invasion of certain retail specialists
other than food suppliers, which
causes further profit erosion. 
As turnaround managers, this implied
that we could not recruit people from
Daiei’s competition because they
themselves were not doing so well.
Even if we were to recruit people
from a competitor, they would surely
apply the same mistakes. Even if that
meant that these recruits did a great
job, the future profitability of Daiei
would not be more than 1.8 percent
per sale. That meant we had to
recruit management from a totally 
different industry, with a totally dif-
ferent perspective, or someone who
was a strong leader in a turnaround
process. 
For those who don’t know the geog-
raphy of Japan, it is a nation made
up of four major islands. Daiei was
profitable in the Kanto and Kyushu
regions, but not so in Chugoku 
and Shikoku. So we had to decide
whether to maintain a presence in
the two unprofitable regions. Also,
we broke down their profitability 
and sales through various divisions.
As part of our due diligence, we
compared the profitability of Daiei’s
food business with its competitor Ito
Yokado and found that Daiei’s food
section did better than its competi-
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tor’s. So we decided to focus on their
strong points, which turned out to 
be food and hardware. Hardware
includes furniture and other small
products for the home. For the latter,
we decided to incorporate a sector
specialist so that the total Daiei store
or mall would be more attractive to
the consumer. From an operational
point of view, Daiei could then solely
concentrate on what is profitable for
them—their food business. 
To summarize, we closed 54 unprof-
itable stores and gave up maintaining
a business in those regions where we
weren’t making money. We will soon
launch 100 small-scale supermarkets
in the Tokyo and Kinki areas. We’ve
already opened up a new experimen-
tal store this month, so if this trial
works, we’re going to expand this
business model to other regions. We
are behind on the renovation of 150
large-scale stores, however, by about
three months. We really have to rush
and play catch-up with that project.
We opened a newly-renovated store
two months ago in the Osaka area,
and sales, compared to the previous
year, are up by more than 130 percent.
So we are thinking this may work for
another 100 existing stores. 
Because Daiei had been suffering for
decades, it could not make any new
IT investments. So we’re budgeting
more than $150 million to improve its
IT system over the next two years. 
For top management, we implemented
an early retirement program. We
encouraged more than 400 people to
leave the company, and the whole
process was managed quite smoothly
because Ms. Hayashi and Mr. Higuchi
had discussed everything very care-
fully with the union.
Thanks to the efforts made by the
IRCJ team, the liquidation of noncore
subsidiaries is going quite smoothly.
Daiei used to have 113 subsidiaries 
in a wide range of sectors. We cate-
gorized everything into core and 
noncore units, and the IRCJ is aggres-
sively trying to sell the noncore units. 
Let me talk about our CEO and COO.
Prior to her current title, Ms. Hayashi
was the President of BMW Tokyo.
She was legendary as a manager in
the car dealership industry. Every-
where she went, that company or
branch became very profitable. So 
of course we wanted to employ her
and incorporate her successful expe-
rience. After graduating from high
school, she worked at Toray and
Matsushita Electric. Since then, she’s
developed her own career very
proactively for BMW and Volkswagen
before becoming a turnaround man-
ager for Daiei. 
Mr. Higuchi was the President of
Hewlett Packard Japan. He is a
Harvard Business School graduate
and a real high caliber guy. He over-
saw the merger between Compaq
and Hewlett Packard, and functioned
as an integration manager as the 
President of the new Hewlett Packard 
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Japan. He conducted a very aggres-
sive layoff program, and yet his inte-
gration process was very successful.
Some of his former colleagues told
me that his method of integration
was something akin to magic. So I
wanted his magic here, at Daiei. 
I have high expectations that the
combination of Ms. Hayashi and Mr.
Higuchi—who hail from totally differ-
ent backgrounds but have the same
ethics and energy—will really turn
around and revitalize Daiei, a really
wilted organization. 
When I was conducting my due dili-
gence on Daiei, I found a poster that
hung in every employee lounge area
that talked about the link between 
a 3 percent return-on-asset and the
employee’s daily performance. Now
how can a part-timer or shop clerk
understand this? That’s when I real-
ized that Daiei was having a hard
time communicating its goals, values,
or direction to its employees.
Company management didn’t tell
store managers what they wanted; it
was like they were ignoring the store
all together. Taking this fact, I figured
there was a big possibility of success
if headquarters communicated to
those in the store to get involved in
the rehabilitation process, to work
together. This is also part of the rea-
son why I hired Ms. Hayashi and 
Mr. Higuchi: they both know how to
talk directly to the employees of each
store. In addition, about 65 percent
of Daiei’s customers and 70 percent
of our employees are female. So by
putting a female CEO in charge of
the new company, we wanted to
deliver a message to our shareholders
and customers that we were in tune
with what the market wanted. 
We also introduced what we call the
key performance indicator, or KPI,
program. The program is split into
two parts. First, store managers have
their own key performance indicators
to help them understand what sales,
campaigns, or programs work in their
store. Second, store managers have
access to activity indicators, so they
can determine how they can achieve
a selected—say 20 percent increase
in sales—goal. These indicators could
be reshelving certain items so they’re
more attractive to the customer, and
so forth. It’s about establishing a
direct link from the store clerk to a
customer’s behavior. If people can
understand the link between action
and result, they are more motivated
to conduct those kinds of actions. 
We have just hired a consulting firm
to finish implementing the program.
A test program was started in several
stores, so we are looking forward to
those results. 
To give you an example of our suc-
cessful renovation of our large-scale
store in Osaka, we made the meat
department very small compared to
the actual size of the store, and inten-
tionally stocked it with mostly local
meats. People seemed much more
interested in buying fresh, local prod-
ucts than national goods, especially
the famous Kobe beef. We also
cleaned up our bakery and general
foods section, which was very dirty
before. How can you enjoy shopping
in that kind of atmosphere? So we
made the amenities of the store much
more attractive, which made the cus-
tomer more comfortable to shop with
us more frequently. In addition, we
made our produce department smaller,
thanks to Mr. Higuchi. One of the
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problems with Daiei’s produce was
that the vegetables were always wilted.
So as his first project, Mr. Higuchi
changed the whole supply chain 
system and bought the produce 
from the local market and not from a
large, national vendor. The lead time
from the market to the store became
much shorter than before, which
resulted in availability of fresher 
vegetables. And the customers also
seemed happier buying local vegeta-
bles as well. The Osaka store also
stopped operating their unprofitable
cosmetics division and invited a 
specialist in, which turned out to be
quite popular. These are the types of
renovations that increased sales by
130 percent when compared to the
previous year, so we’d like to quickly
implement similar moves for our
other large-scale stores as well. 
Lastly, let me quickly explain about
the development of our new mission
statement. In order to share the new
management’s values, Ms. Hayashi
and Mr. Higuchi wanted a new mis-
sion statement. So the first thing they
conducted was a survey of all 50,000
Daiei employees, including 40,000
part-timers. We got a surprisingly
high response rate of 90 percent.
Each director was assigned to read
some 4,000 survey responses, so
nobody got any sleep. But we
learned so much from it. For example,
one housewife working as a part-
timer confessed that she was hesitant
to answer any customer inquiries, so
much so that she would physically
remove herself when she sensed
someone needed her help. So some
workers were reluctant to have direct
contact with a customer. And as we
read through each survey, several
common themes came out. In the
end, the directors talked through a
two-night, three-day session to come
up with a new mission statement. 
With these actions, Daiei stock is up
by about 70 percent since we took
over the company. I hope the market
is saying that the firm is taking con-
crete action to revitalize itself. I think
Daiei is an example of how private
equity and other strategic investors
can work together in a large-scale,
corporate application. By releasing a
company from various constraints or
assumptions given by former owners,
a company is able to realize its
potential. I believe private equity
firms will be a catalyst and play a
lead role in this movement in the
future. I also think the IRCJ has
played a significant role in accelerat-
ing this process in Japan. Transferring
the IRCJ’s experience and skills to the
private equity industry and private
sector will be very important to build
a stronger economic structure. 
HUGH PATRICK
R. D. Calkins Professor of International
Business Emeritus and Director,
Center on Japanese Economy and
Business, Columbia Business School
We’ve had two excellent presentations
from different, yet complementary,
perspectives about Daiei’s restructur-
ing. I won’t comment much on
Advantage Partners, but will say a 
bit about the IRCJ because I think it
is such a good success story and is
unique among Japanese government
institutions. 
First of all, the IRCJ will only be
around for five years. All Japanese
institutions in principle want to be
eternal. As I recall, the IRCJ comes to 
an end in March 2008. So its lifespan
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is already half over. Second, the IRCJ
is also unique since it is run by out-
siders such as President Saito, who
was recruited from the private sector
because of his expertise. It is not run
by government bureaucrats. Also, as
Mr. Saito stressed, the IRCJ is pro-market
and pro-competition. Its task has been
to overcome private market failures in
restructuring and thereby set up the
criteria and norms for how tough, but
fair and effective, corporate restruc-
turing in the private market can work
in the future. It has had educational
and institution-building roles that
have been particularly important. 
The IRCJ starts its restructuring essen-
tially by buying the claims of the
peripheral lenders, the non-main
bank lenders, and getting them out 
of the way, so they can then work
out a deal with the main banks in
terms of write-downs of debt and
other operations. Most of the IRCJ’s
41 cases have been relatively small, 
but there have been two major cases. 
One is Daiei and the other is
Kanebo. I don’t know a great deal
about the background of the Daiei
case, but it has had a long and com-
plex history with many layers and
players involved: the company man-
agement, the founder family, the core
banks, government officials (especially
from the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) and the
Development Bank of Japan), politi-
cians, and most recently, the IRCJ,
Advantage Partners, and Marubeni. 
The specifics have already been dealt
with thoroughly so I’m not going to
say anything about them, but I’d like
to provide a little historical context
on Daiei, as I understand it. As Mr.
Sasanuma said, Daiei was started in
the early postwar period, in 1957, by
a very bold, risk-taking entrepreneur.
Mr. Nakauchi built Daiei to be a
major retailer, but also expanded it
into a range of other activities. As
many of you know, Daiei also owned 
a baseball team and hotels, and was 
a provider of financial, real estate,
and investment services. 
Even though the company was pub-
lic, I understand the founder and his
family continued to really control the
firm. Mr. Nakauchi maintained cen-
tralized control. A firm that has been
started by an entrepreneur’s family
has both its strengths and, ultimately,
its weaknesses. 
Earlier, Daiei’s three mistakes were
mentioned; I will stress two. One was
that in the late 1980s, Daiei expanded
rapidly by increasing the number 
of stores and entering new business
areas with borrowed money. Of
course, when the financial bubble
burst, Daiei was stuck with all that
debt. The second mistake was made
in the 1990s when Daiei thought the
economy would be getting better and
all they had to do was wait it out.
However, things got worse and
worse, and the family was very reluc-
tant to sell their assets—even their
good assets—until prices were too
low. Daiei was very slow to carry 
out its own restructuring. 
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Daiei restructuring has been a complicated, political game.
—Hugh Patrick
UFJ, which was Daiei’s main bank,
had a heavy concentration of its
loans to Daiei and to a few other
zombie companies. This put UFJ into
a very difficult balance sheet position
of its own, and I would argue that
this ultimately led to its demise. Of
course, the polite term is “merger,”
which it recently concluded. 
Another thing that’s interesting is that
METI became increasingly involved.
It sent its senior staff to take manage-
ment positions, arranged for financ-
ing from the Development Bank of
Japan, and provided tax and other
forms of support. I remember a con-
versation I had with a UFJ manager 
a couple of years ago. He had men-
tioned that Daiei was no longer a
problem for them since it was now 
a problem for the government, or
METI. He was feeling much more
relaxed about it all. 
Incidentally, it’s my impression that
METI opposed the IRCJ taking over
Daiei because they were trying to
engineer a private workout, though
unsuccessfully And indeed, one reason
that process was so slow was that
METI was an obstructionist. I see some
of you nodding your head in agree-
ment with my interpretation. Daiei
restructuring has been a complicated,
political game, but that is another
story. Maybe we’ll be able to talk about
it more openly two years from now. 
Discussion
Patrick: I have two questions for
each of the speakers. Let me start
with Mr. Saito. First, both the govern-
ment and distressed companies have
been concerned that restructuring
should not be done at the expense of
reducing the number of employees.
The Financial Times has said that part
of the Daiei deal was precisely some
sort of implicit employment guaran-
tee. From the viewpoint of the IRCJ,
how important has the maintenance
of employees been as a Keiretsu cri-
terion for your restructuring program?
Second, in light of the ongoing cozy
relationships between banks and core
Keiretsu member firms, how far has
the IRCJ gone in overcoming these
market failures you stressed during
your presentation? Are there any seri-
ous issues still out there?
For Mr. Sasanuma, first, newspaper
articles have suggested that there are
substantial areas where Marubeni and
Advantage Partners interests overlap,
but there exist areas of potential con-
flict and friction as well. I would like
to hear a bit more about what they
have been and how they have been
resolved. Second, has the IRCJ’s own-
ership of one-third of Daiei shares
posed any problems for you? From
the IRCJ’s point of view, can you
complete your restructuring before
they have to go out of business? And
what’s going to happen to their shares
two-and-a-half years from now? 
Saito: To answer the question about
employee reductions, that was natu-
rally the most delicate, sensitive sub-
ject for us. Particularly in the case of
Daiei, they have many local stores.
Although Tokyo and Osaka may be
recovering, the economic scenario
outside of the cities is still quite
gloomy. Thus layoffs quickly turn
into a political or social problem in
Japan. However, as Mr. Sasanuma
mentioned in his speech, the labor
union has been very supportive of
the IRCJ. It is ironic that labor union
representatives are more serious in
their struggle to fix this problem than
the executives of companies are. If
you treat them very carefully and
with respect, unions will accept many
reforms. So far, that’s been the case
for Daiei. But the company did hand
out special money for people to
leave the company to minimize
potential social upheaval. 
As for the tradition of maintaining
inefficient business relationships, of
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course this has been a very serious
problem for Japan. In the United
States, you often find very rational
judgments being made. However, that
is also unique in this world. Both
Europe and Asia often maintain these
so-called sticky relationships, and
they play a major role when compa-
nies make business decisions. 
However, our efforts with Daiei and
its creditors were very strict. For
example, when we were assessing
the value of Daiei’s balance sheets,
we found excessive debt that was not
commensurate with the real value of
assets. We asked the banks to forgive
this debt, and thereby introduced a
rational and theoretical way of
restructuring Daiei. The banks were
hesitant at first but gradually accept-
ed this method. And now, even
bankers are establishing their own
corporate restructuring departments
internally to follow suit the IRCJ way. 
So I think Japan is gradually chang-
ing, but it has not completed or 
finished this process just yet. 
Sasanuma: To answer Hugh’s first
question, Advantage Partners basically
needs Marubeni’s help. When Daiei
announced that it was going under
the control of the IRCJ and conduct-
ing an out-of-court workout, many
suppliers tried to withdraw from 
existing contracts, especially food
suppliers. The suppliers got really 
nervous, thinking they will soon 
be cut off, so before they could be 
damaged, they tried to withdraw.
Marubeni thus stepped in to supply
products to Daiei. So we don’t feel
like Marubeni has been aggressively
pushing their products onto Daiei. 
One small example I can give you
about potential conflicts is what hap-
pened a few weeks ago. Without
anyone realizing, Marubeni had intro-
duced a new supplier to Daiei. This
was first noticed at a meeting we 
had with Marubeni after the fact, so 
I just asked Marubeni to share their
planned changes before implement-
ing them. Basically we resolved the
issue by acknowledging that we
needed to communicate better. Larger
conflicts will probably come about
when Advantage Partners tries to exit
from the investment. Marubeni has
indicated its long-term commitment
to Daiei, so it might be a possible 
buyer of our stock. Of course they 
would want a cheap price, and we
would want to sell our shares at a
higher price, which is where a poten-
tial conflict may happen between us,
Marubeni, and the IRCJ. That said,
Advantage will not exit before the
IRCJ does. So we may end up buying
the IRCJ’s shares first, since we have
the option to do so. But besides that,
we are working very closely with the
IRCJ team and we share the same
values and goals, which is to encour-
age Daiei employees to really work
together and rehabilitate their company.
So we are very comfortable working
with them. 
Question: Daiei announced yesterday
that October same-store sales were
down by 10 percent. Could you please
shed some light on what’s going on
with sales? Why did this happen?
Sasanuma: In November, sales were
up by 1 percent so we have bounced
back. That said, October sales were 
down since we changed our vegetable
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supply chain so that we could provide
better products to our customers. 
Our supply chain management was 
a bit chaotic for the past two months.
Please note, however, that this is 
not just occurring at Daiei. Sales at
Daiei’s competitors, such as Ito
Yokado, have also been down by
about 7 percent. So this is an industry-
wide trend. 
Question: I am wondering how you
recruit people for top management pos-
itions. Do you go through an agency,
your customer network? How do you
find the right person for the job? 
Sasanuma: We have about 50 to 70
candidates on a potential-hire list. We
track their record, their strengths and
weaknesses, their personality, their
will to work at another company as a
manager. So, when we have an open-
ing, we look at this list, and hopefully
we find an appropriate person to fill
the position. But it doesn’t always
mean that we’ll hire someone from
the list. We do have a network in the
headhunting industry, so we talk to
them about finding the best person. 
A big issue for any shareholder is to
identify the type of management a
company has. By deeply analyzing
this, we naturally can find a person
who has the best profile, skill, or per-
sonality to fill a top management posi-
tion. We go to the headhunter with a
very detailed explanation of who
we’re looking for. From my experi-
ence, this enables us to find a better
candidate more smoothly. 
Question: Mr. Saito, you had men-
tioned that Daiei’s equity value had
almost doubled due to all the restruc-
turing efforts. As a government entity,
does the IRCJ have the incentive to
increase its return from this investment?
Saito: The IRCJ uses taxpayer funds
so we do not have to make a profit
on our investments, but we also
shouldn’t take a loss, although we
are not legally prohibited to take a
loss. So far, fifteen out of our 41
cases were profitable. But since Daiei
and Kanebo combined account for
about 70 or 80 percent of the IRCJ’s
total investment value, if Mr. Sasanuma’s
management team fails, I would have
to ask them some severe questions
about what was going on since
everyone is waiting for their debts 
to be paid back. Naturally, I am 
not working for the money. I am
working to recover Daiei. My staff 
is very professional and many of
them have spent fifteen or twenty
years in the revitalization business.
Some of them used to be very rich
working for private firms, but their
patriotism made them jump to the
IRCJ. Japan has many things it can 
be proud of in manufacturing tech-
nology, but we are still behind in
international market practice. The
message we’re trying to bring to 
corporate Japan is that we need 
new blood, for the sake of the
national interest.  
Question: Wal-Mart has been strug-
gling to implement its business model
at Seiyu. Do you think Seiyu will also
have to go through a similar restruc-
turing process like Daiei? 
Sasanuma: Wal-Mart declared that
they’re going to provide full-scale
help for Seiyu by infusing $1 billion
or so. The firm is also trying to be
more flexible and to change their
method to a more Japan-oriented 
system, so I think things are going 
to work out. The situation at Seiyu 
is different from that at Daiei. 
Question: There has been a lot of
talk about the increase of buyout
firms in Japan, both domestic and
foreign. Are there more Daiei’s out
there? Will there be other significant
opportunities available to the buyout
community?
Sasanuma: I think the restructuring 
of large companies like Daiei is pretty
much completed. I think buyout firms
will have opportunities in the mid-size
or middle-market areas for public
companies. I’m quite skeptical if
another large buyout of a public firm
can occur, so I’m very interested to
see how these companies will pursue
different opportunities. 
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